The Education Gadfly Weekly

The macro trend that will have the greatest impact on the American education system over the next decade or two is our declining birth rate and the resulting enrollment crisis facing many public schools. We have too many schools for too few kids and, as a result, thousands of schools are going to need to close.

With students in short supply, then, one can understand the natural impulse to say that we should slow down or even halt the creation of new schools, including charter schools. Why make the problem of excess capacity even worse than it already is?

But policymakers and those of us in the charter school movement need to resist that line of thinking—indeed, we need to combat it hard and fast. That’s because what’s in even shorter supply than students are high-quality schools. Yes, we have too many school buildings in many communities in America. But we don’t have nearly enough excellent schools. And fixing that should continue to be the mission of the charter school sector.

Not surprisingly, charter opponents see it different. Teachers unions and their allies would love to use this moment to cap the growth of charter schools, even roll them back. And unfortunately, some sensible people are starting to listen to them. In Washington, D.C., for example, Mayor Muriel Bowser, who has been relatively friendly to charter schools during her two-plus terms in office, published a “boundary and student assignment study” that calls for the D.C. Public Charter School Board to consider the impact of new charters on enrollment in individual D.C. Public Schools before approving them.

This is deeply wrongheaded. Imagine if we had adopted that same line of thinking twenty or thirty years ago, during the last big period of urban school closures. We would have thousands fewer charter schools than we do today, and hundreds of thousands of kids would be worse off. We know that because of the overwhelming and growing evidence that students in charter schools, especially in urban charter schools, learn dramatically more year over year than their counterparts in traditional school districts, and achieve stronger real-world outcomes, too.

If our priority is to remediate learning loss, boost achievement, and improve long-term prospects for low-income students, then creating great schools where students can thrive must be job number one. That means growing the charter school movement.

Charter schools should close, too

That’s not to say the charter sector shouldn’t also take its fair share of lumps. It’s always a good time for authorizers to close low performing charter schools, but being aggressive makes more sense now than ever. Rather than showing patience while time and the marketplace take their course for schools in a downward spiral of declining enrollment and/or weak achievement, authorizers might step in and close schools more urgently. Not only will that put failing charter schools out of their misery, but it will free up market share, and potentially free up buildings, for other higher-performing charter schools to tap.

We at Fordham recently released a study by Sofoklis Goulas of the Brookings Institution which identified almost 500 public schools that are both low achieving (according to their own states) and which have seen enrollment drop significantly in recent years. As we wrote in the report, not all the schools on that list should necessarily be closed, as the way states define quality is not always ideal, and there might be local context that needs to be considered. Still, the 500 schools should at least be candidates for closure.

And guess what: Some of these are charter schools—sixty-three to be exact, although subtracting the “dropout recovery schools” that wound up on that list due to their low graduation rates brings down that number to thirty-nine.

Closing some of these schools would demonstrate that the charter sector is serious about quality and would underscore the principle that school effectiveness should be a factor when deciding which campuses to shutter. That would also give the charter movement the moral high ground to demand that districts also prioritize school quality when making these decisions.

But let’s not be naïve. Charter opponents will scream bloody murder when they see authorizers approving new schools or growing or replicating existing ones at the same time that districts are shuttering campuses. We shouldn’t be shy about defending such a course of action, especially since charter school growth is not the primary reason that district schools are emptying out. That might have been the case in the 1990s or 2000s, when the charter sector was growing like gangbusters, but as a brand-new analysis by the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools illustrates, only some of recent district enrollment declines are connected to charter growth. No, districts have mostly themselves, plus demographic trends, to blame. And the longer they wait to take action, the more painful it will become.

We know it’s been easiest for the charter sector to grow in places where public-school enrollment as a whole was also growing. It’s no accident that Arizona was the fastest-growing charter state for many years, given that the Grand Canyon State as a whole was attracting families at a record clip. Its districts couldn’t possibly keep up and, as a result, the charter sector enjoyed much support and relatively little opposition.

But now we face the opposite dynamic, at least in much of the country. That creates a zero-sum political environment, one where we should expect sharp elbows to be more common than open arms.

Let’s remember what we stand for, charter community: quality choices for families. As long as those are scarce, we need more great charter schools, not fewer.

Chicago’s troubled school district has made national headlines recently—from the mass resignation of its appointed school board, which opposed the mayor’s efforts to borrow nearly $300 million at ruinous rates to give the teachers union a sweetheart contract, to the likely ouster of the district’s superintendent. But the city has also become a powerful symbol in the brewing battles over rightsizing efforts in the face of declining enrollment and expiring federal pandemic aid.

A decade ago, Chicago closed approximately fifty schools, one of the largest consolidation efforts in recent memory, and the consequences continue to be disputed. Much of this debate engages in selective cherry-picking of data and misleading interpretations of the evidence, giving rise to confusion about what (if any) lessons district leaders across the country should learn from Chicago’s experience.

A recent article by Thomas Toch and Maureen Kelleher, leaders of Georgetown University think tank FutureEd, suffers from many of the same problems. To understand the many things the authors get wrong about Chicago—as well as the few points they get right—it is important to examine the most important claims in their piece.

Claim: School closures caused student achievement to decline

“Shuttering the schools didn’t improve academic outcomes for their students,” Toch and Kelleher wrote, noting that displaced students “had lower math scores for at least four years after transferring.”

I’ve emphasized before that this is highly misleading. As the careful University of Chicago evaluation of Chicago’s closures showed, all the negative achievement impacts occurred in the year that planned consolidation was announced—before a single school had closed. This can be seen in the figure below, which is taken directly from the report. I’ve added a large red arrow over the announcement year, which corresponds to the test score drop.

The most likely explanation for the decline is the organized campaign to fight closures and the associated circus and psycho-drama that these efforts created. (This is also the reason the University of Chicago evaluation proposed to explain the increase in absenteeism that same year, speculating that “communities, schools, and families were advocating for their schools not to close” instead of making sure students were attending class.)

Interestingly, achievement began to rebound quickly once the buildings were actually shuttered and students moved to their new schools (although math scores dipped again a few years later). This pattern can be seen in the figure, with the negative effects shrinking in each of the first two post-closure years.

It would also be a huge mistake to draw strong conclusions about the impact of school closures on academic outcomes from Chicago alone. Studies in other cities that have closed a significant number of schools show that well-planned consolidation efforts can move the needle upward on learning.

In Newark, for example, students displaced by closure of their schools saw their achievement improve by between 10 percent and 15 percent of a standard deviation—sizable effects that researchers attributed to “reap[ing] the benefits of moving to higher value-added schools.” In New Orleans, closing low-performing district buildings and reopening them under charter management improved achievement even more. And a few weeks ago, a new study of the “portfolio” reform model in Denver found large gains by students forced to switch schools when theirs closed.

Claim: Closures pushed families to leave the district

Toch and Keller claim that school closures “contributed to the decline of the low-income Black neighborhoods where the schools were located,” citing an analysis published last year by the Chicago Sun-Times and WBEZ. That analysis, the authors assert, “found that Black neighborhoods that experienced a permanent school closure in 2013 subsequently lost population at three times the rate of other Chicago Black neighborhoods.”

These numbers may be right, but they get the causality backwards: Expected population declines drove school closure decisions, rather than closures driving future population declines.

In the run-up to its 2013 consolidation efforts, Chicago commissioned a massive 450-page facilities plan that included, among other analyses, enrollment projections by neighborhood. The report noted that population had declined significantly between 2000 and 2010 in the heavily Black areas on the city’s South and West Sides and projected that the numbers would keep falling further in the coming years in many of these same places.

The table below, taken directly from the 2013 report, shows the change in the number of children in each Chicago neighborhood anticipated between 2011 and 2016. I’ve also highlighted the areas demographers identified as having already undergone “extreme” population loss over the previous decade—a decline in the number of children of more than 5,000. The key takeaway is that the projections anticipated additional declines in the same neighborhoods where population was already sharply falling years before the closures were announced and where affected schools were located.

That population numbers subsequently declined disproportionately in neighborhoods where schools closed suggests that those projections were accurate and the district was wise to use them to target closures in the places it expected student enrollments to keep falling. These numbers provide no evidence that closures caused population losses above and beyond those that were expected to happen anyway.

Oddly, after claiming that “closures contributed” to the population decrease, Toch and Keller acknowledge this point, noting that the data “don’t prove that the school shutdowns accelerated declines in neighborhoods that were already depopulating.”

Claim: District officials exaggerated the budgetary savings from consolidation

When making the case for their right-sizing efforts, Chicago officials estimated that they would save $1 billion over the next decade—roughly half in the form of avoided capital maintenance and upkeep costs and half by reducing the number of building principals and clerical staff. Toch and Keller are right to note that these estimates proved to be off the mark—although the district did save about $250 million over this period on lower administrative and support staffing levels. To say that the savings were exaggerated does not mean that no efficiencies were achieved.

Importantly, however, the district’s budget projections never took into account (and Toch and Keller never discuss) the main way in which building closures save money: by reducing the number of teachers and aides. Instructional staff account for by far the largest budget item in public education, so it makes sense that closures generate the most cost savings by reducing headcounts in that category.

In research for my forthcoming book, which examines school consolidation efforts across the country over the past two decades, I found that school closures cause teacher employment levels to decline by between 5 percent and 10 percent in the affected districts, with class sizes rising modestly and per-pupil expenditures declining by between $500 and $1,000 per year. The reason closures produce such savings is that even massively under-enrolled schools require a minimum complement of teachers to offer a viable education program. Consolidating these buildings reduces the number of teachers by eliminating half-empty classes.

Given the popularity of teachers—and the political power of their unions—it is not surprising that district officials are loath to advertise the fact that building closures will cause teacher staffing to shrink. It is much easier to claim that cost savings will come from elsewhere. But ignoring the staffing changes among frontline educators dramatically understates the actual efficiencies that consolidation can (and do) unlock.

Bottom line: School closures can work, but must be done right

To their credit, Toch and Kelleher conclude their article by writing, “School districts can’t ignore the inefficiencies of under-enrolled schools, especially when they are faltering academically. But the aftermath of Chicago’s school closings a decade ago points to the importance of a clear-eyed approach that prioritizes public transparency and takes into account the financial, academic and community consequences of closings.”

I could not agree more. When closing schools, districts should prioritize academic considerations—most importantly, shuttering schools that post the smallest year-to-year gains in achievement—instead of using budgetary bean-counting to choose the buildings. Community members should avoid dramatic protests, recognizing that efforts to save schools, however well-meaning, could disrupt learning more than the closures themselves. District leaders should be honest with taxpayers that most of the fiscal savings will come by reducing teacher headcounts, not through savings on utility costs or building maintenance needs. They should carry out these staffing reductions strategically by culling the weakest (rather than least experienced) teachers and not rely on attrition alone. And they should make the vacant buildings available to address their communities’ most pressing needs—allowing strong charters to purchase them to increase access to high-quality education options or working with developers to build badly needed housing.

Executed effectively, school closures can be a lever for positive change. Even in Chicago.

As the clock winds down towards Election Day, Colorado voters—myself included—face an important decision beyond the presidential contest: whether to amend the state constitution to enshrine a “right to school choice.” To be clear, the Centennial State has a long and proud record on the issue. Fifteen percent of all Colorado public school students—my nine-year-old daughter among them—attend charter schools. More than a quarter participate in open enrollment within or across traditional district boundaries. Yet the state lacks a private school choice program (though it once had a short-lived district-level voucher program). This is where proponents and opponents of Amendment 80, the “Constitutional Right to School Choice Initiative,” part ways on the implications of this measure, should it come to fruition.

Simply worded and seemingly innocuous, the ballot measure comes in at around one-hundred words:

Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Colorado:

SECTION 1. In the constitution of the state of Colorado, add section, 18 to article IX as follows:

Section 18. Education - School Choice (1) Purpose and Findings. The people of the state of Colorado hereby find and declare that all children have the right to equal opportunity to access a quality education; that parents have the right to direct the education of their children; and that school choice includes neighborhood, charter, private, and home schools, open enrollment options, and future innovations in education.

(2) Each K–12 child has the right to school choice.

Sponsored by a conservative non-profit group, it requires 55 percent of the vote to pass. Whether it reaches that threshold remains to be seen, but similar school choice initiatives in Colorado have failed in the past, even when the state leaned Republican.

Supporters of the measure, which include the Colorado Association of Private Schools and the Colorado Catholic Conference, are pushing for its passage as a hedge against the teachers unions and their backers, who have vehemently opposed all alternatives to the traditional system. While the amendment likely wouldn’t affect Colorado’s “Blaine Clause”—a provision that prohibits the use of public funds to support religious schools—now arguably a dead letter in the wake of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, proponents say that a constitutional right to school choice would serve as a last line of defense. This would be crucial should the legislature (or a local school board) do something completely out of bounds. From imposing burdensome regulations upon private schools to cracking down on homeschooling, advocates are trying to cover all their bases. Additionally, it could provide greater protections for charter schools, which have been increasingly under threat in recent years. For instance, it could empower parents to challenge denials of charter applications by local school districts.

The opposition spans a laundry list of characters from the teachers unions to libertarians wary of government interference. The former label the measure a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” claiming that it paves the way for public funding of private schools, while the latter argue that the proposal undermines parental rights and opens the door to government overreach. One local columnist made no bones about his skepticism:

When [the measure] likely fails, the enemies of educational choice will cry, “The people have spoken, and they don't want school choice. It's a mandate.” And it has been tough enough to keep charter schools safe from this choice-hating legislature.

[The measure] does not create a new school choice program (or even framework for a program) of any kind. It only creates a new avenue for lawsuits that may or may not lead to some sort of jurisprudence many years in the future.

Should it pass, [the measure] would put a “right to school choice,” including “private” schools, in the Colorado Constitution, but doesn’t define what “private schools” means. The legislature and the courts will have to interpret it, and that could lead to regulating private schools.

Alarmed by the prospect of government encroachment, homeschoolers, in particular, are vocally in opposition to the measure.

Colorado’s main charter school organization is attempting to stay above the fray. (Full disclosure: I serve on its board of directors.) So is the state’s pro-charter governor—a Democrat. While there’s a lot to like about codifying a child’s right to school choice, the proposed amendment places charter schools in a politically tricky position. Republicans are currently the only party willing to support them, and charters have become verboten among Democrats (save for the state’s Democratic governor!). Making matters worse, the amendment could create confusion about the judiciary’s role. As one local professor quipped, “[The measure] really is a ‘full employment for lawyers’ act. It puts judges in the driver’s seat later on to try to make some sense out of this.”

With fourteen statewide measures on the ballot, proponents have their work cut out for them. What they might perceive as straightforward, critics view as ambiguous. With a presumption of good intentions from the measure’s sponsors, history and experience suggest that more preparation and groundwork were needed to rally and unify Colorado’s disparate school choice stakeholders around any referendum. Should this one go down in defeat, it may be because this latest iteration of school choice advocacy became more about political theater than substantive policy.

The growing popularity of career and technical education (CTE) at the high school level creates an ongoing need for more teachers with industry experience to provide hands-on instruction in a diverse variety of fields. Before we can expand the pipeline to keep up with demand, however, it’s helpful to know more about the CTE teacher workforce we already have. A recent descriptive study from Educational Researcher fills in some important details and highlights potential concerns.

Boston College analyst Shaun Dougherty and colleagues examined the employment patterns of CTE teachers in Tennessee, including entrances and exits from the profession, where teachers come from and go, and how those patterns differ by license type and CTE field. They use data from the state’s longitudinal system covering 2010 to 2018. Teacher staffing files include information on job roles, school assignments, certification and licensure data, and multiple demographic variables. They add NCES school-level data and use employment insurance records for teachers working in Tennessee before, during, and after their public education teaching careers, which provide earnings data and the industries where employed. The analysis focuses on high school teachers, over 30,000 of them, of whom about 6,000 are CTE teachers. On average, CTE teachers comprise approximately 18 percent of all high school teachers in the state, have slightly less teaching experience than their average non-CTE teaching peer, and are about three years older. They are also more likely to be male.

The researchers’ models are descriptive, not causal, but they control for differences in age and experience at entry, as well as gender, race, postsecondary degree status, year, and school. To predict earnings for exited teachers, they control for prior earnings and for quarters worked in the eight quarters before and after the exit, among other observable teacher characteristics. As a sort of case study, they also look into the extent to which teacher turnover in health sciences, in particular (chosen for its popularity among all CTE fields), affects course offerings.

Their analysis finds that CTE teachers with occupational licenses—which means they are substituting industry employment experience and other industry certifications for traditional teacher preparation pathways—leave at noticeably higher rates than non-CTE teachers. And among CTE teachers, those with occupational licenses leave more often than those with traditional licenses—roughly a 25 percent higher rate of exit. Turnover is highest in what are termed “growth fields,” such as health sciences, IT, and STEM, especially among teachers who have less than ten years of experience. Additionally, exit rates are also higher among the trades, including manufacturing, construction, and transportation.

Those who leave are also the most likely to earn more on the outside, which is perhaps not surprising, given their experience prior to teaching. On average, non-CTE teachers who exit the profession earn $90,000 annually two years after leaving, while occupationally licensed CTE teachers earn considerably more, especially in those aforementioned “growth fields.” At the high end, former CTE teachers can earn $110,000 annually, about 20 percent more than they did while teaching.

On the school side, the researchers found that the exit of one health science teacher results in the net loss of roughly one course section. While they could hire a temp or a substitute until a permanent teacher is found, it is more likely that schools will simply cancel the course until they find a new teacher. One thing schools can’t do: lump students from one section into another teacher’s class—which they might do for a typical math or science course—as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) imposes strict guidelines on class ratios for CTE courses.

What does all this mean? Dougherty and the team write that action is required from education and policy leaders to “improve the retention of CTE teachers and support their success and development in the classroom.” Of course, we need to keep happy the teachers we have and recruit more.

But these recommendations fail to consider that CTE is not a general education model. Reading between the lines, the most valuable CTE instructors for students are likely those most in touch with the fields they teach. This means that grabbing up workforce-experienced individuals and sequestering them in the classroom for twenty-five years should not be the goal. Instead, some form of industry-to-classroom-to-industry cycle is preferable as a professional development model for CTE instructors, especially as it keeps their skills current. But changing from a closed door to an intentional, revolving door will require some non-traditional adjustments and out-of-the-toolbox thinking.

SOURCE: Hannah Kistler, Shaun Dougherty, and S. Colby Woods, “Teacher exit and educational opportunity: Lessons from career and technical education,” Educational Researcher (January 2024).

The jury remains out regarding the true impact of pre-K enrollment on early elementary outcomes. Some research finds a positive impact, some a negative, and much of it shows the fading out of impacts by third grade or soon thereafter. A new report by researcher Hyunwoo Yang adds to the evidence by looking at Wisconsin 4K, a long-standing pre-K program funded and administered by state and local education agencies and offered in public elementary schools and standalone childcare centers. 

Under this program, all four-year-olds in the state are eligible to participate and can attend pre-K free of charge. However, districts may opt out of providing programming in any form, leaving thousands of eligible families without a convenient location. Those families can open-enroll in another district, but spaces are not guaranteed to non-residents and there are costs associated. A number of different scheduling options (including full-day, full-week, part-day, and part-week) provide families with flexible choices to meet various needs and to help providers run their programs in the most cost-effective manner.

According to research-recommended standards for ECE policies in the United States, Wisconsin 4K is considered “moderately high quality.” The state has established standards for teacher qualifications (bachelor’s degree and an elementary or regular education license) and learning benchmarks and set out some guidelines on content, including coverage of ten subjects in required curricula (including science, health, social studies, and art—at an appropriate level for youngsters of course), and the requirement that 30 percent of the curriculum should comprise reading and English language arts. Beyond that, program structure is variable from site to site and is described as mostly “play-based.” 4K sites can be district-run or contracted out to private providers—and can take place in district buildings or standalone sites—although districts are ultimately responsible for all programming regardless of form. As of 2018, 98 percent of districts offered 4K in some form, and approximately 75 percent of four-year-olds were enrolled. The vast majority of students attended part time and fewer than five days per week (not surprising, since only 2 percent of districts even offered a full-day, all-week program). The report cites data from the 2013–2014 school year (the last one under study for new 4K enrollment) showing the average per-child expenditure was $5,618. Newer numbers not included in the study cite a steady decrease in that average since 2017.

Yang looks at statewide administrative and student achievement data from nearly 300 districts that launched and ran 4K programs between the 2001–2002 and 2013–2014 school years. Unfortunately, precise enrollment data are not available, but Yang approximates based on the following year’s kindergarten enrollment, with appropriate cautions issued. Ditto for socioeconomic-status data, which are not mandatory for part-time 4K families to provide and thus is extrapolated based on the following year’s kindergarten demographics. The analysis likely underestimates the actual number of low-income students participating in 4K in each cohort.

Student test score data come from annual administrations of the Wisconsin Knowledge and Concepts Examination (WKCE) to third grade students each fall. WKCE testing covers more subjects, but Yang’s analysis sticks with math and reading only. Students are grouped into the four WKCE achievement categories—advanced, proficient, basic, and below basic. Overall, the data encompass 292 districts with 3,495 year-by-district observations over twelve years. Since districts implemented Wisconsin 4K programing at different times, approximately 59 percent of the observations fell into a post-treatment period (after students had participated in 4K), while 41 percent were captured prior to 4K implementation. Yang reports his impact findings at the district level due to the near universality of 4K programming, allowing him to capture any spillover effects on non-treated students, which are difficult to capture at the student level.

His analysis finds that implementation of 4K boosted district reading scores by 0.091 of a standard deviation (SD) in the model without controls (approximately a 15 percent increase in the number of students who achieved proficient and advanced levels of reading compared to pre-treatment outcomes) and 0.104 SD in the model with controls (controlling for, among other things, year fixed effects). That translates to a 20 percent increase in the number of students who achieved proficient and advanced levels of reading. Positive impacts were strongest among low-income students, at 0.165 and 0.177 SD with and without controls, respectively, equivalent to a 40 percent increase of such students achieving proficiency and advanced levels. There was, however, no statistically significant impact on reading achievement among higher-income students. The positive effect of 4K was also much greater for the reading scores of Hispanic students (0.323 and 0.333 SD with and without controls, respectively, equivalent to a 50 percent increase) than any other racial or ethnic category. There were, however, no statistically-significant effects on math achievement for 4K students, no matter how the data were sliced.

Caveats cited by Yang include the lack of data on what preschool experiences non-4K students are participating in and what other enrichment part-time 4K students take part in when not involved in the program. Additionally, the non-standardization of curriculum and programming (along with other unobserved differences from site to site) makes it impossible to suggest what specific mechanisms are driving the impacts. This research also does not address the possibility of positive impacts fading out beyond third grade. However, the positive points of Wisconsin 4K likely include the near-universal availability, some strong curricular features, and the cost-effectiveness of delivering programming in this manner. More evidence is still required for the jury to come to a verdict on the longer-term impacts of pre-K education.

SOURCE: Hyunwoo Yang, “The Effects of Wisconsin’s Universal Prekindergarten Program on Third-Grade Academic Achievement,” American Educational Research Journal (September 2024).

On this week’s Education Gadfly Show podcast, Parker Baxter, Director of the Center for Education Policy Analysis at the University of Colorado, joins Mike and David to discuss his new report on the impact of Denver’s education reforms. Then, on the Research Minute, Amber shares a RAND survey on teachers’ experiences with school violence and lockdown drills.

Recommended content:

• Parker Baxter, Anna Nicotera, David Stuit, Margot Plotz, Todd Ely, and Paul Tesk, Systemwide and Intervention-Specific Effects of Denver Public Schools’ Portfolio District Strategy on Individual Student Achievement, Thomas B. Fordham Institute (September 2024)
• “Denver doesn’t spell doom for portfolio-style reform” —Paul T. Hill
• “With student enrollment plummeting, which schools should be considered candidates for closure?” —Amber M. Northern and Michael J. Petrilli
• Pauline Moore, Melissa Kay Diliberti, Brian A. Jackson, Teachers’ Experiences with School Violence and Lockdown Drills, RAND (2024)

Feedback Welcome: Have ideas for improving our podcast? Send them to Stephanie Distler at [email protected].

Cheers

• A clarion call for keeping MCAS, Massachusetts’s exit exam, as a graduation requirement, as it ensures students have a foundational understanding of math, science, and English. —The Editorial Board, Boston Globe
• A new rule promulgated by the Biden administration would require the replacement of “virtually every lead pipe in the country…tackling a major source of a neurotoxin that is particularly dangerous to infants and children.” —New York Times

Jeers

• By the end of September, 27 states had still not released their spring standardized test results to the public. —EduProgress
• The entire Chicago Board of Education is set to resign, allowing Mayor Brandon Johnson to appoint new members who could oust Chicago Public Schools CEO Pedro Martinez—with whom Johnson has sparred over the city’s budget. —Chalkbeat Chicago

• In which a leading center-right columnist rethinks the proposition that education can ameliorate America’s inequalities in the information age. —David Brooks, The New York Times
• A new study by researchers from Yale and Brown reveals that expanding childcare can significantly boost earnings for American workers. —Catherine Rampell, The Washington Post
• Vice President Harris’s campaign is shifting away from the idea of college for all and focusing instead on the expansion of non-college pathways. —Preston Cooper, The Hill