In recent years, states and especially districts have turned to financial incentives to encourage high-performing teachers to work in low-performing or otherwise hard-to-staff schools. The idea is appealing—let’s reward great educators for helping students who need them most—and so far, the research seems promising. We know, for example, that when teachers independently choose to transfer to a new school, they remain at least as effective as they were previously, and we know that when incentives bring high-performing teachers to low-performing schools, those schools receive better teachers than they would have without the incentive. In a new contribution to this body of work, a recent study published by the Annenberg Institute explores whether teachers remain as effective when they transfer schools in response to a large financial incentive.
As my colleague Amber Northern discussed on Fordham’s podcast, the study relies on data from the Transfer Talent Initiative (TTI), a 2009–11 study funded by the federal Institute of Education Sciences. The TTI researchers selected ten large, economically diverse districts with at least forty elementary schools, at least ten of which were low-poverty and at least fifteen of which were high-poverty. Within each district, schools were defined as low-performing if they were in the bottom 23 percent of either average student achievement or school accountability ratings. Chosen from the other 77 percent of schools, high-performing teachers were defined as those performing in the top 20 percent of similar subject-grade teachers, based on their impact on student academic growth over a three-year period. These teachers were then eligible to apply for vacancies at the low-performing schools in the same district, with a $20,000 transfer stipend as an incentive ($30,000 in 2025 dollars). They would commit to remain at that school for at least two years. Out of 1,520 identified candidates, 330 applied, and ultimately 80 elementary and middle school teachers participated in either the 2009–10 cohort (seven districts) or the 2010–11 cohort (three districts). The present study relies on the TTI data, district-level data, and survey data from the incentive-eligible teachers. The data, however, do not extend beyond 2011.
The researchers compare the “incentivized-transfer teachers” to “control vacancy-filling teachers,” who filled vacancies without any special incentive. Compared to their control-group peers, the incentivized teachers had previously been more effective, and their transfers led to a larger change in the characteristics of students whom they taught (e.g., achievement, poverty, and minority status). In the first year following the transfer, the change in performance among control-group teachers was not statistically significant, whereas the effectiveness of incentivized teachers dropped, on average, from the 85th percentile to the 66th. The decrease in teacher value-added was larger in math (-0.15 standard deviations) than in English language arts (-0.09 standard deviations). According to one of the analysts’ models, the second year saw these teachers recover almost all their effectiveness in ELA, though very little in math; another model found that their effectiveness did not recover at all.
The study identifies three main drivers of the effectiveness drop among incentivized teachers:
- Student-specific human capital. Incentivized teachers were more likely to go to a school with a student population significantly different from what they were accustomed to. When students’ needs and skill levels are different, the work of teaching becomes different—and in this case probably more difficult, since these teachers were necessarily moving into lower-performing schools.
- Teacher-school match. When teachers freely choose a new school, they take into consideration factors like curriculum, technology use, and overall school culture. They may prioritize choosing a school that aligns with their individual strengths and preferences. Here, however, the incentivized teachers’ options were limited not only to the bottom 23 percent of schools, but also by the TTI research managers, who further narrowed applicants’ options in order to expedite hiring for the purposes of the study.
- Indirect school effects. The teachers’ new schools tended to have less favorable systemic conditions for teaching. For example, incentivized teachers were less satisfied with their new schools’ discipline policies, resources, opportunities for autonomy, and parental involvement.
Notably, neither changes in adult human capital (i.e., quality of colleagues) nor direct school effects (e.g., tutoring, extended days, or other activities with a direct impact on students) seemed to have a substantial impact on effectiveness.
So, if the top teachers lose effectiveness when they follow financial incentives into low-performing schools, should states and districts forget about these programs? Not necessarily, for three reasons. First, the incentivized teachers remained more effective than those whom the schools would otherwise have hired (and, as was reported at the time, elementary school achievement rose—though middle school performance did not). Second, the study didn’t track data after the second year, so it’s entirely possible that the teachers continued to improve as they learned to work with a new student body and in a new setting. Finally, if the TTI process had not nudged incentive applicants toward specific schools, they might have chosen schools that were a better match, thereby better supporting their effectiveness.
Note, though, that even with a large incentive, few teachers pursued the opportunity. As Amber noted years ago, only 5 percent of the total eligible pool participated. Eighty jobs across ten large districts isn’t a lot. In a small or medium-sized district, there likely wouldn’t be enough movement to make much difference.
State and large-district leaders contemplating such a program should thus consider: How much can they reasonably afford to spend on incentives, and will it be enough to motivate potential candidates? How much need is there in the lowest-performing schools? And to what extent can receiving schools foster conditions that will best support incentivized teachers? Paying high-performing teachers to work in low-performing schools can benefit the students most in need—but education leaders ought to weigh the logistical and financial tradeoffs.
SOURCE: Matthew A. Kraft, John P. Papay, Jessalyn James, and Manuel Monti-Nussbaum, “Is Teacher Effectiveness Fully Portable? Evidence from the Random Assignment of Transfer Incentives,” Annenberg Institute at Brown University (February 2026).
