A Crowded Table: Teacher Union Strength in 2026

***

The ecosystem of state education politics grows ever more crowded, with some new actors aligned with traditional union priorities but a seemingly larger number often working against them. Of course, teacher unions are still a major force in state-level education politics. But as our report demonstrates, they have a more complex landscape to navigate. And for those of us in education reform, the same may be true: Though union interests must still be reckoned with, there are many others with a seat at the table. To ensure the spread of policies and practices that are grounded in evidence and best for kids, we’ll need to rethink our assumptions about who or what stands in the way.

Introduction

Over the past fifty years, teacher unions[1] have established themselves as powerful actors in education policymaking, particularly at the state level, where the constitutional authority for governing education lies. Directly and indirectly, unions have influenced educational policies, school spending, and student achievement.[2] But this influence varies across states. In 2012, the Thomas B. Fordham Institute released the first comprehensive state-by-state ranking of teacher union strength, a framework that has informed research and practice over the past decade and a half. This report updates and extends that analysis by addressing a central question: Across states, where are teacher unions strongest and weakest today?

Since 2012, three major national events have changed the context within which state teacher unions operate. First, the Supreme Court’s 2018 Janus v. AFSCME decision declared union agency fees unconstitutional for public-sector workers, including teachers. That is: Teacher unions can no longer negotiate to charge fees to nonmembers to fund collective bargaining efforts on their behalf. Second, the wave of “RedforEd” teacher strikes in 2018 and 2019—particularly in states such as West Virginia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arizona—demonstrated that even in weak union states, teachers could mobilize for collective action. Third, the COVID-19 pandemic put teacher unions at the center of fraught debates over school reopening, remote instruction, and safety protocols. In some states, this moment strengthened the perceived influence of unions and may have helped them secure policy wins around working conditions. In others, slow reopening timelines may have generated political backlash with long-term consequences for public support.

Our updated rankings have taken into account a research base that has expanded since the original rankings’ publication. For example, more evidence now shows that state policies allowing collective bargaining strengthened teacher unions in the 1960s and ’70s, with little impact on school finance,[3] while policies that limit collective bargaining have both weakened teacher unions and led to decreases in school spending.[4] Other recent studies suggest that some teacher union activities ultimately help students, but others reduce school efficiency.[5] These studies have tended to frame teacher union activities as rooted in either “rent-seeking” or amplifying “teacher voice,” though the most recent research emphasizes unions’ more indirect, coalitional, and political efforts in state and local politics.[6]   

We examine contemporary teacher union strength across states using 59 measures from publicly available datasets, public data compiled by our research team, and an original survey of education stakeholders in each state, which we fielded from June to October 2025. Using these data, we rank all 50 states and the District of Columbia (D.C.) both overall and within five core areas:

• Area A: Resources and Membership
• Area B: Involvement in Politics
• Area C: Labor and Bargaining Policies
• Area D: Policy Wins and Losses
• Area E: Perceived Influence

The rankings capture each state’s teacher union strength relative to other states, not strength in absolute terms. Collectively, they demonstrate that teacher union strength is multidimensional: States can have favorable laws but weak membership or can have strong perceived influence despite limited resources. Rather than treating teacher unions as a monolith, these rankings help us understand variation in the ways that teacher unions hold and exert influence across states, providing policymakers, advocates, and researchers with new knowledge on where and how teacher unions shape public education in the United States.

In this report, we first describe the areas, indicators, and sub-areas that our union strength rankings comprise, as well as our approach to creating the scores and rankings. We then present overall and area-specific rankings and highlight changes since the 2012 report for the sub-indicators that are most predictive of the overall rankings and consistent over time. Next, we examine relationships within and among the five areas and analyze state characteristics associated with union strength. Finally, we offer key takeaways and implications for policy and practice.

Data and Methods

We use a three-level structure to organize and analyze the data:

• Areas are the big-picture categories—the major ways union power shows up in the real world (e.g., “Resources and Membership”). We identify five areas of teacher union power (see Figure 1).
• Indicators are the specific concepts that we measure within each area. For example, “union membership” and “revenues” are among the indicators for the “Resources and Membership” area.
• Sub-indicators are the specific data we collected. They come from three sources: publicly available datasets, public data compiled by our research team, and an original survey of education stakeholders in each state. For example, “union density” is a sub-indicator for the indicator “Resources and Membership.”

Across all five areas, the report uses 59 sub-indicators. Of these, 30 are either direct updates of legacy sub-indicators or close adaptations that preserve continuity with the 2012 framework. Wherever possible, we updated the sub-indicators using the same sources. In cases where publicly available data are no longer tracked consistently or have disappeared entirely, we use the best available substitutes that capture similar dynamics. For more information, see Appendix Table A1.

We also added new data sources to complement the previous work. The 29 new sub-indicators reflect both changing contexts and our expanded, contemporary understanding of union strength. For all sub-indicators, we use the most recently available data.

Finally, six sub-indicators from the previous report are not included in the current analysis, in most cases because of limitations in availability of updated data.

For a full account of these changes, see Appendix B.

As Table 1 shows, the data in Area A: Resources and Membership measure the resources that teacher unions can mobilize to exert power in state politics, gauged via membership, organizational capacity, and financial resources. These include membership (A1), teacher strikes (A2), revenues (A3), and presence at the ballot box (A4).[7]

Table 1. Area A: Resources and Membership (20 percent of total score)

A1. Union membership (5% of total score)	Percentage of public-school teachers who are members of the union (2020–21)
	Union density: percentage of all employees who are members of any union (2024)
A2. Teacher strikes (5% of total score)	Number of teacher strikes (2019–24)
	Percentage of districts engaged in strikes (2019–24)
A3. Revenues (5% of total score)	Total yearly revenue per teacher of the state National Education Association (NEA) affiliate and/or the state American Federation of Teachers (AFT) affiliate, adjusted using the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Comparable Wage Index (2023)
A4. Union vote share (5% of total score)	Percentage of state voters who are union members (2022)
	Percentage of state voters who are both union members and employed in the educational services industry (2022)

As Table 2 shows, the indicators in Area B: Involvement in Politics measure the activities that unions engage in to exert power, including candidate endorsements (B1), financial contributions to campaigns and political parties (B2), and spending on political advertisements (B3). These indicators capture both overt forms of political influence and the agenda-setting role that teacher unions may play in politics.

Table 2. Area B: Involvement in Politics (20 percent of total score)

B1. Candidate endorsements (6.67% of total score)	Number of candidate endorsements by state teacher unions (2024 general election)
	Percentage of endorsed candidates by state teacher unions who won their elections (2024 general election)
B2. Financial contributions to campaigns and political parties (6.67% of total score)	Percentage of all contributions to state-level candidates originating from teacher unions (2019–24)
	Percentage of all contributions to state-level political parties originating from teacher unions (2019–24)
	Union contributions to state-level candidates, relative to other major interest groups (2021–23)
B3. Political advertisements (6.67% of total score)	Number of political ads sponsored by teacher unions (2020 and 2022)
	Percentage of political ads sponsored by teacher unions (2020 and 2022)
	Amount of money spent on political ads by teacher unions (2020 and 2022)
	Percentage of political ad spending by teacher unions (2020 and 2022)

As Table 3 shows, the indicators and sub-indicators in Area C: Labor and Bargaining Policies consist of the laws, rules, and procedures under which teacher unions must operate for each state. These sub-indicators—automatic revenue policies (C1), scope of bargaining (C2), right to strike (C3), and collective bargaining exemptions (C4)—reflect the extent of constraints around union activity. For example, where collective bargaining is permitted, unions have a wider institutional opening to advance their interests.

Note that this area focuses on operational policies and therefore does not include other common union priorities, such as policies on teacher performance or school choice; the latter are captured in Area D: Policy Wins and Losses.

Table 3. Area C: Labor and Bargaining Policies (20 percent of total score)

C1. Automatic revenue policies (5% of total score)	Presence of state-level policies allowing or prohibiting automatic payroll deductions (2025)
C2. Legal scope of bargaining (5% of total score)	Legality of collective bargaining (2025)
	Breadth of bargaining: presence of state-level policies requiring, permitting, or prohibiting bargaining on 16 topics (2025)
C3. Legal right to strike (5% of total score)	Legality of teacher strikes (2025)
C4. Exemptions from collective bargaining (5% of total score)	Presence of state-level policies allowing or prohibiting automatic collective bargaining exemptions for charter schools (school year [SY] 2018–19)

Area D: Policy Wins and Losses measures the extent to which state policy aligns with union priorities across ten policy areas (see Table 4). Of the ten indicators, three—relative state-level spending on education (D1), employment benefits (D5), and teacher compensation (D10)—gauge the amount of money going toward union priority causes. The other seven account for the presence or absence of specific policies. For example, because teacher unions typically advocate smaller class sizes, indicator D3 (class size) reflects the presence of a state-level policy restricting K–12 class sizes. Conversely, because teacher unions tend to oppose performance-based pay, indicator D2 (teacher performance pay) reflects the absence of a state-level policy requiring it.

Table 4. Area D: Policy Wins and Losses (20 percent of total score)

D1. Relative spending on education at the state level (2% of total score)	Percentage of the total annual K–12 budget spent on teacher salaries and benefits (SY 2021–22)
	Total annual per-pupil expenditures, adjusted using the NCES Comparable Wage Index (SY 2021–22)
	Percentage of the state’s annual general budget spent on K–12 education (fiscal year [FY] 2023)
D2. Teacher performance pay (2% of total score)	Absence of state-level policies requiring the use of teacher performance in determining compensation (2022)
D3. Class size (2% of total score)	Presence of state-level policies restricting K–12 class sizes (2024)
D4. Teacher evaluations (2% of total score)	Absence of state-level policies allowing for dismissal based on ineffectiveness (2025)
	Absence of state-level policies that require use of student growth measures in teacher evaluations (2025)
D5. Employment benefits (2% of total score)	Retirement: employer contribution rate to teacher retirement plans as a percentage of the payroll (FY 2022)
	Tenure: presence of state-level policies providing tenure protections for K–12 teachers (2023)
D6. Charter school structural limitations (2% of total score)	Absence of state-level policies allowing the establishment of charter schools (2025)
	Presence of state-level policies placing caps on or otherwise limiting the number of charters granted (2025)
	Presence of state-level policies limiting the types of charter schools allowed (2020)
	Absence of state-level policies allowing multiple authorizers for charter schools (2025)
D7. Charter school policy exemptions (2% of total score)	Absence of automatic exemptions from many state or local laws and regulations (2020)
	Presence of state-level policies requiring teacher certification for charter schools (2020)
D8. Unionized charter schools (2% of total score)	Percentage of charter schools with collective bargaining (SY 2018–19)
D9. School choice and voucher policies (2% of total score)	Absence of state-level policies allowing education savings accounts (ESAs) (2024)
	Absence of state-level policies allowing tax-credit scholarships (2024)
	Absence of state-level policies allowing vouchers (2024)
	Percentage of the K–12 student population not using private education choice programs (SY 2021–22)
	Percentage of the K–12 student population using traditional public schools (SY 2021–22)
D10. Teacher compensation (2% of total score)	Average salary of public-school teachers (SY 2023–24)

To collect data for Area E: Perceptions of Strength, we conducted an original survey of actors with knowledge of education policymaking in each state.[8] With the 2012 survey as a guiding framework, the new survey asked respondents how they perceived the power of teacher unions in their states, with questions mirroring the themes of Areas A, B, and D. We also included questions about perceptions of teacher union strength more generally. However, we did not include questions related to labor and collective bargaining policies (Area C), which are a matter of public record.

For example, to learn about perceptions of union resources and membership, we asked about the likelihood that teachers in their state would follow through with a strike if they said they would. Similarly, to assess perceptions of union political involvement, we solicited a characterization of how unions handle compromise in policymaking.

Because the survey captures respondents’ perceptions of union influence, it may not accurately reflect their influence on policy. For example, a respondent may assume teacher unions are powerful (or not) based on inaccurate information, popular narratives about unions, or historical experiences that may no longer hold. Still, perceptions are critical to shaping how policy elites respond to teacher unions throughout the policymaking process, and they help capture informal levers of power that may not be visible in other data.

To create the survey sample, we conducted extensive online searches to identify leaders across the following categories:

1. Legislative leaders on education issues
2. Governors’ education advisors
3. State education administrators (state superintendents and state school board members)
4. Teacher unions
5. Education advocacy organizations
6. Non-education advocacy organizations focused on children
7. Journalists covering state education policy and politics
8. Members of the business community engaged in education issues

As in 2012, we set a standard threshold for inclusion of at least three respondents from each state—and reached or exceeded it in all 50 states and D.C.[9] The survey was fielded between June and October 2025, with a total response rate of 25 percent. Among those who responded, 62 percent completed the full survey. In total, we received 171 completed surveys.

All survey questions referred to teacher unions as “teacher unions/associations” to ensure relevance in states where collective bargaining is prohibited or where unions refer to themselves as associations. See Table 5 for an overview of question topics. A complete list of survey questions can be found in Appendix Table A2.

Table 5. Area E: Perceived Influence (20 percent of total score)

E1. Perceptions of available resources and membership (Area A) (5% of total score)	Level of agreement with “Teacher unions/associations in [STATE] can mobilize members to engage in actions aligned with union/association priorities”
	Breadth of mobilization activities: perceived ability of teacher unions to engage members in eight mobilization activities
	Perceived likelihood of following through on a threat to strike
	Perceived ability to leverage a strike to influence policy
	Perceived availability of local teacher union power
E2. Perceptions of involvement in politics (Area B) (5% of total score)	Perceived necessity of teacher union support to be elected or appointed to state-level office, average across four positions
	Perceived need for teacher unions to compromise as a condition of influence
	Perceived influence over policy implementation
	Perceived influence via working relationships with legislators
E3. Perceptions of policy wins and losses (Area D) (5% of total score)	Level of agreement with “Teacher unions are effective in defeating education reform proposals with which they disagree”
	Level of agreement with “State-level education policies reflect teacher union/association priorities”
	Level of agreement with “Teacher unions have been effective in keeping education spending steady by preventing or minimizing cuts in the education budget”
	Perceived influence on state-level education policies, average of measures of relative influence across six policy areas
E4. Overall perceptions of state teacher union power (5% of total score)	Identification of the teacher union as either the most or one of the most influential entities in K–12 education policymaking in the state
	Perceived influence of teacher unions, relative to other policy influencers, on a scale of 0–100
	Level of agreement with “Teacher unions/associations in [STATE] are stronger today than they were five years ago”

We constructed overall state rankings—as well as overall scores, area scores, and area rankings—through a multistep aggregation process that applied equal weighting across multiple levels. Consistent with the 2012 report, the equal-weighting approach reflects a methodological judgment that each dimension of union strength merits equivalent consideration in the overall ranking. The aggregation proceeded as follows:

1. Standardization. We rescaled all sub-indicators to a consistent 0–4 scale, with higher values corresponding to greater union strength, so that we could combine sub-indicators with different original metrics (e.g., percentages, dollar amounts, survey responses).
2. Indicator-level aggregation. For each indicator, we calculated the simple mean of all constituent sub-indicators within each state. This produced a single 0–4 score for each indicator in each state.[10]
3. Area-level aggregation. For each state, we calculated the simple mean of all indicators within each area. This produced overall area scores for each state, which in turn allowed us to generate area-specific rankings.
4. Overall scores. We calculated overall union strength by taking the simple mean of all five area scores for each state. Although the theoretical range of the overall strength score is 0–4, the observed range is 0.7–2.6, with a mean of 1.5 and a standard deviation of 0.5.
5. Overall rankings. We rank state unions from strongest (highest overall strength score) to weakest (lowest overall strength score) based on their overall scores.

Rankings

Table 6 shows the overall rankings alongside the rankings for each of the five areas. The states with the strongest teacher unions are Vermont, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Hawaii. The states with the weakest teacher unions are Arkansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Mississippi.

Table 6. Which states have the strongest teacher unions?

Figure 2 shows how different dimensions of power contribute to each state’s total score and ranking. Vermont and California have notably stronger unions than other states.

Per the table and the figure, the states with the strongest teacher unions tend to show “comprehensive” union strength. For example, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New York score highly across nearly all five areas, with particularly strong showings in Area A: Resources and Membership, Area E: Perceived Influence, and Area C: Labor and Bargaining Policies.

Conversely, the states with the weakest teacher unions are typically weak in all five areas. And the very weakest union states score especially low in Areas A, B, and C: Resources and Membership, Political Involvement, and Labor and Bargaining Policies. This suggests that teacher unions can maintain perceived influence (Area E) and secure some policy victories (Area D) even in states where they lack the organizational resources and friendly institutional environments of their counterparts in stronger union states—or perhaps that teacher-friendly policies are supported by voters and other education groups that advocate for them, even where teacher unions are weak.

Some states in the middle of the pack earned substantially different rankings in different areas. For example, Pennsylvania and Michigan have substantially lower scores in Area D: Policy Wins and Losses than they do in other area scores. Their reputations as historical union strongholds may mean state leaders perceive them as influential, even as they lack the political influence to shape education policies. The lack of policy wins may also be caused by other interest groups effectively aligning against union positions. Still other states rank mid-tier overall, between 21st and 35th, but rank highly in one area, showing “selective” union strength (Table 7).

Table 7. “Selective” strength states are often ranked highly in Area D: Policy Wins and Losses.

Area of “Selective” Strength	Mid-Tier States with “Selective” Strength in This Area
A: Resources and Membership	None
B: Involvement in Politics	New Hampshire, Virginia
C: Labor and Bargaining Policies	Utah
D: Policy Wins and Losses	Iowa, Kentucky, South Dakota, Wyoming
E: Perceived Influence	Maine

Figure 3 shows the geographic distribution of teacher union strength in Area A: Resources and Membership. Per the figure, the five states with the most strength in this area—Hawaii, New Jersey, Vermont, New York, and California—are all located in the Northeast or Pacific West, whereas the five states with the least strength—Arizona, Georgia, Arkansas, South Carolina, and Mississippi—are all located in the South or Southwest.

Figure 4 shows rankings for Area B: Involvement in Politics, specifically elections and campaigns. It is important to note that teacher unions contribute to both the Democratic and the Republican parties, including within the same state. Still, the five states with the highest levels of teacher union engagement in politics—California, Vermont, New Jersey, Virginia, and Massachusetts—are all “blue” states, whereas the five states with the weakest engagement in politics—Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, South Dakota, and Oklahoma—are “red” states.

Figure 5 shows state rankings for Area C: Labor and Bargaining Policies. Per the figure, the five states with the most restrictive bargaining policies—Arkansas, Georgia, Texas, Alabama, and North Carolina—are in the South, whereas the five states with bargaining policies most favorable to teacher unions—Vermont, Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, and Ohio—are in other regions.

Figure 6 shows the rankings for Area D: Policy Wins and Losses. Although policy context generally aligns with union strength, the states with the strongest teacher unions don’t consistently rank highly in Area D. For example, the five states with the most union-aligned education policies are Vermont, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Kentucky; although the first four of these are the top four in overall strength, Kentucky is much lower on the list, coming in 28th. At the other end of the spectrum, the five states with policy environments least aligned with teacher union policy positions are Colorado, Louisiana, Arizona, Indiana, and Florida. The last three are among the bottom ten in overall strength, but Louisiana is a little higher, at 39th, and Colorado is mid-tier overall, at 26th.

Figure 7 shows the perceived influence of teacher unions in each state. The five states where perceived influence is strongest are California, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington. The five states where perceived influence is weakest are Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.

PATTERNS OF TEACHER UNION STRENGTH

The previous section highlights some of the patterns that emerge from the overall and area rankings. Below, we investigate these patterns more formally and comprehensively.

In general, the relationships discussed in this section are simple correlations. In other words, they show whether two things tend to vary together, not whether one causes the other or how they interact with other factors.

To understand the factors that matter most for teacher union strength, we examine the correlations between each sub-indicator and the state’s overall union strength score. Think of each of these correlations as a test: How well could you predict a state’s overall union strength score if you knew just one piece of information about it? A correlation of zero would mean a sub-indicator has no predictive power. A correlation of 1 would indicate the ability to perfectly predict the overall score with the sub-indicator in question.

Table 8 shows the ten sub-indicators that are most correlated with overall strength. See Appendix Table A7 for a full list.

Table 8. Union membership, voter share, and revenues are strongly correlated with overall union strength.

Area	Factor	Correlation
A	Percentage of teachers who are members of the union	0.82***
A	Percentage of state voters who are union members	0.81***
A	State union density (2024)	0.81***
A	Total 2023 revenue per teacher of state NEA/AFT, adjusted using NCES CWI	0.81***
E	Perceptions of Area D: Policy Wins and Losses	0.73***
A	Percentage of state voters who are union members and in educational services	0.70***
D	Teacher salary in SY 2023–24	0.70***
E	General perceptions	0.66***
E	Perceptions of Area A: Members and Resources	0.63***
D	Total annual per-pupil expenditures per state, adjusted using NCES CWI	0.62***

Notes: *** p<0.001; estimates reflect correlations with the overall state score. Table 8 shows the ten most correlated factors. See Appendix Table A7 for all correlation coefficients.

Union membership, voter share, and revenues seem to matter most. For example, 92 percent of public-school teachers are union members in the ten states with the strongest teacher unions, compared with just 60 percent of teachers in the other 41 states and D.C. Similarly, 11 percent of voters in the top ten states are labor union members, whereas the share of voters who are labor union members is less than half that (5 percent) in all other states. And teacher unions in the top ten states collect an average of $877 per teacher annually, compared with just $356 per teacher everywhere else.

Stakeholder perceptions also generally track with overall teacher union strength. In other words, when state leaders say unions are powerful in their states, they’re describing patterns that are also evident in the other observed measures of union strength.

Similarly, teacher policies and union strength are correlated. For example, states where unions are more powerful tend to be states that pay teachers more and spend more per pupil, even with adjustments for regional cost differences. Again, we don’t know whether strong unions cause higher spending or whether the same state characteristics that lead to generous education funding also create favorable conditions for union organizing.

Finally, collective bargaining laws are correlated with union strength, but perhaps less than expected. Per Figure 8, the top ten strongest states all require district management to engage in collective bargaining if the majority of teachers in the district vote for it. However, 60 percent of states that are not in the top ten also require collective bargaining if teachers vote for it, and another 25 percent allow collective bargaining. And even three of the weakest union states require collective bargaining if teachers vote for it. In other words, although collective bargaining laws certainly matter, they do not guarantee teacher union strength at the state level.

Teacher policy wins and losses are generally correlated with overall strength, but a few teacher policy wins and losses stand out as being particularly unrelated to overall strength. For example, half of the top ten states have a state policy that limits class sizes for at least some K–12 grades, but so do 44 percent of states that aren’t in the top ten. In fact, policies setting a cap on class sizes are actually more common in the ten states with the weakest unions, seven of which have statewide caps.

Other notable policies that are seemingly unrelated to the overall ranking include the share of each state’s general budget that is spent on K–12 education, whether student test-score growth is used in teacher evaluations, and the degree to which state law allows for the creation of different types of charter schools. See Appendix Table A7 for details on policies that are most and least correlated with union strength.

As Appendix Table A8 indicates, Area A: Resources and Membership and Area B: Involvement in Politics are the most highly correlated with each other. In other words, state unions with more members and money tend to be more politically active. Similarly, Area A is strongly related to Area C: Labor and Bargaining Policies and Area E: Perceived Influence, suggesting that organizational strength may also translate into both favorable labor laws and stakeholder perceptions of union clout, or vice versa.

In contrast, Area C: Labor and Bargaining Policies and Area D: Policy Wins and Losses are the least correlated, suggesting that states can have union-friendly labor laws on the books without their unions necessarily winning their current policy battles—and vice versa. As noted, this disconnect hints at an important reality: Statutory protections for collective bargaining don’t automatically translate into union wins. After all, most states with collective bargaining protections enacted those laws in the 1960s and 1970s, when the configuration of interest groups at the state and local levels was very different from what it is today.

To be clear, there is a relationship between labor and education policies—states with union-friendly labor policies are somewhat more likely to have more union-friendly education policies—but that’s the weakest link among all the areas we examine. If union strength were really driven by these laws, and if teacher unions were really the strongest players in education politics, then the states with stronger laws would be the states where education policies best match typical union preferences.

To understand the types of states where teacher unions are strongest and weakest, we examine how union strength relates to 24 state demographic, economic, and political characteristics.[14] See Appendix Table A9 for a complete account of these relationships.

In general, political factors have the strongest relationships to teacher union strength relative to the other external factors we considered. As Figure 9 shows, states where the Democratic presidential candidate received a larger share of the vote in 2024 generally also had stronger teacher unions. For example, in the ten states with the strongest teacher unions, the Democratic presidential candidate won 56 percent of the vote in 2024, compared with just 44 percent elsewhere. Moreover, eight of these ten states had Democratic trifectas in 2024, as did nine of the other 40 states, meaning that Democrats held the governorship and majorities in both legislative chambers. Even economic policies unrelated to education tell the same story. For example, the ten strongest union states have minimum wages averaging $15 per hour, compared with $10 in other states. In short, teacher union strength tracks closely with Democratic political power across multiple dimensions.

Notably, teacher unions are weaker in less advantaged places. For example, the ten states with the weakest teacher unions have markedly higher poverty rates: 17.5 percent compared with 13 percent elsewhere. Their residents are also less educated, with only 35 percent holding bachelor’s degrees, versus 40 percent in other states. Finally, these states have roughly twice the share of Black residents that other states have, 16.7 percent versus 8.7 percent.

Although these relationships suggest that teacher unions are weakest in states where students are least socioeconomically advantaged, they do not mean that students are faring worse academically. For example, some states with less wealthy populations, particularly in the South, have made substantial gains on the National Assessment of Educational Progress in recent years.[15]

Figure 10 compares the 2012 and 2026 rankings. The dashed line reflects an exact match between the 2012 and 2026 rankings. In other words, if a state falls on the line, it indicates no difference between its 2012 and 2026 rankings. For example, Kentucky came in 28th overall in both rankings, and Georgia was 45th both times. If a state is above the line, its relative ranking has increased since 2012, and if it is below the line, its relative position has decreased.

Nine states moved 10 or more positions in either direction. In the largest decline, Wisconsin fell from 18th to 36th, perhaps a consequence of the 2011 law that limited collective bargaining. Conversely, Virginia jumped from 47th to 29th, the most dramatic rise among the historically weak-union Southern states. This change may be related to a law implemented in 2021, which removed Virginia’s prior prohibition against teacher collective bargaining.

Yet there was notable stability for many other states’ rankings. Eighteen states changed by three or fewer rank positions. Seven states were ranked in the top ten both times: California, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Rhode Island. At the other end, seven states consistently ranked in the bottom ten: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.

We advise caution in interpreting comparisons over time because these changes partly reflect methodological updates and structural shifts in the policy environment. Still, the broad areas of strength have remained consistent over time, and the relative rankings can provide informative snapshots for empirical examinations of relative change in strength across states over time.

While these comparisons focus on relative strength across the states and D.C., we also call attention to some changes over time on the legacy sub-indicators, which provide evidence of shifts in teacher union strength in both relative and absolute terms. One of the clearest trends since 2012 is the erosion of union membership. In 46 of 50 states, as well as D.C., the percentage of teachers belonging to unions has declined since 2012. And of course, declining membership doesn’t just reduce revenue; it weakens political influence, diminishes perceived credibility, and makes it harder to mobilize members for collective action. That may play a role in the finding that, proportionally speaking, teacher unions’ contributions to state-level political parties have decreased in 34 states and increased in 16. Tellingly, stakeholders have also noted a decline: Less than one-third of respondents to our survey listed the state teacher union as the most influential actor. In other words, other groups—governors, business coalitions, parent organizations, education reform advocates, or legislative leaders—are now perceived to be equally or more influential than teacher unions.

Takeaways

Conclusion

Teacher unions have long been considered the “800-pound gorilla” of education politics. As such, they continue to influence state education policy, even in states where they lack formal bargaining rights. Still, it is important to resist the temptation to view state education politics solely through the lens of teacher union power. Other actors matter, and in many states, they matter more.

Our analysis suggests that the importance of these “other” actors is growing. Yet we know relatively little about them. If teacher unions are no longer the dominant force in most states, who is? How do governors, state boards of education, business coalitions, parent groups, and reform organizations exercise influence? How do these actors interact with one another and with teacher unions? And above all, how do these interactions affect students and schools?

In this complex, contested, and constantly evolving landscape, teacher unions remain central players. However, they operate within broader political ecosystems that shape their ability to translate resources and influence into tangible policy wins. Our rankings provide detailed maps of where unions are strongest and weakest today. The next challenge is understanding how that strength fits into the broader ecology of organizations and interests that shape American education today.

INDIVIDUAL STATE PROFILES

Table 9. State rankings of teacher union strength (Click the column headers to sort by state or overall rank.)

State ▲▼	Overall Rank ▲▼
Alabama	38
Alaska	9
Arizona	43
Arkansas	51
California	2
Colorado	26
Connecticut	12
Delaware	22
District of Columbia	35
Florida	41
Georgia	45
Hawaii	5
Idaho	40
Illinois	7
Indiana	42
Iowa	21
Kansas	25
Kentucky	28
Louisiana	39
Maine	24
Maryland	13
Massachusetts	3
Michigan	18
Minnesota	11
Mississippi	47
Missouri	37
Montana	16
Nebraska	27
Nevada	30
New Hampshire	23
New Jersey	4
New Mexico	20
New York	10
North Carolina	48
North Dakota	31
Ohio	17
Oklahoma	50
Oregon	6
Pennsylvania	15
Rhode Island	8
South Carolina	44
South Dakota	32
Tennessee	49
Texas	46
Utah	34
Vermont	1
Virginia	29
Washington	14
West Virginia	19
Wisconsin	36
Wyoming	33

Appendices

Table A1. Indicators, sub-indicators, and sources

Table A2. Survey items

Table A3. The percentage of K-12 teachers who are union members has decreased in most states.

Table A4. The percentage of political contributions to state-level political parties that come from teacher unions has decreased in over two-thirds of states.

Table A5. There were few changes to state-level collective bargaining laws between 2012 and 2025.

Table A6. Most states moderately increased per-pupil spending between 2012 and 2025.

Table A7. Union membership, voter share, and revenues are strongly correlated with overall union strength.

Table A8. Area A: Resources and Membership is most correlated to overall union strength, whereas Area D: Policy Wins and Losses is least correlated.

Table A9. Teacher union strength is strongly correlated with Democratic control and the presence of a minimum wage.

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; estimates reflect correlations with the overall state teacher union strength score. External data sources: the American Community Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U.S. Department of Labor, Caughey and Warshaw (2018), and Ballotpedia. Where 2025 data are unavailable, we use linear interpolation from prior years.

We use a total of 59 sub-indicators to determine our ranking of union strength. Thirty are comparable with those used in the 2012 survey, with 20 unchanged and ten adjusted. Twenty-nine supplementary sub-indicators are new to this report, and six sub-indicators from the prior report are not included this time.

For the 20 unchanged legacy measures, the data were either from the same source or from a source that reports data in the same way as the sources from 2012. For example, for revenue, we used a different source to locate the 990 forms but used the same underlying data source to calculate the same measure.

Below are the 20 measures that did not change between reports:

1. Membership: percentage of teachers who are members of the union
2. Revenue: total per-teacher yearly revenue of the state National Education Association affiliate and/or the state American Federation of Teachers affiliate, adjusted using the NCES Comparable Wage Index
3. Financial contributions to campaigns and political parties: percentage of all contributions to state-level candidates originating from teacher unions
4. Financial contributions to campaigns and political parties: percentage of all contributions to state-level political parties originating from teacher unions
5. Financial contributions to campaigns and political parties: total teacher union contributions to state-level candidates divided by the total contributions to state-level candidates by the other top ten specific businesses
6. Legal scope of bargaining: legality of collective bargaining
7. Legal scope of bargaining: breadth of the scope of bargaining
8. Right to strike: legality of teacher strikes
9. Exemptions from collective bargaining: presence of state-level policies allowing or prohibiting automatic collective bargaining exemptions for charter schools
10. Performance pay: presence of state-level policies requiring the use of teacher performance in determining compensation
11. Evaluations: presence of state-level policies allowing for dismissal based on ineffectiveness
12. Evaluations: presence of state-level policies that require use of student growth measures in teacher evaluations
13. Class size: presence of state-level policies restricting K–12 class sizes
14. Charter school structural limitations: presence of state-level policies limiting the number of charters granted (caps)
15. Charter school structural limitations: presence of state-level policies limiting the types of charter schools allowed
16. Charter school structural limitations: presence of state-level policies allowing multiple authorizers for charter schools
17. Charter school policy exemptions: presence of automatic exemptions from many state or local laws and regulations
18. Relative spending on education at the state level: annual percentage of the total K–12 budget spent on teacher salaries and benefits
19. Relative spending on education at the state level: total annual per-pupil expenditures, adjusted using the NCES Comparable Wage Index
20. Relative spending on education at the state level: annual percentage of state’s general budget spent on K–12 education

Ten adjusted measures are similar to 2012 sub-indicators, but because of the time between data collections, there were more substantive changes in how the data were reported. For these, the concept is captured in a similar way, but the data may be more or less comparable, depending on the measure. Where updated data were unavailable, we used the most similar updated source. All survey items that reflected the 2012 survey are considered adjusted measures, as samples, question order, and wording changed between administrations.

Table B1. Eleven sub-indicators from 2012 were adjusted because of changes in data availability and political context, with two of those measures combined, resulting in ten adjusted sub-indicators.

Twenty-nine supplemental measures are new to the report.

1. Percentage of all employees who are members of any union. This sub-indicator was added as an indicator of the state context. States with more union members across fields are more likely to have multiple labor organizations that can coordinate and more likely to have a culture that values unions as political and social entities.
2. Number of teacher strikes. This sub-indicator shows how frequently teachers mobilize via one of the most visible forms of union political power.
3. Percentage of districts engaged in strikes. This sub-indicator differentiates between a state where teachers across many districts are engaging in strikes and states where only a small number of districts engage in multiple strikes. It therefore helps reflect the breadth of influence throughout the state.
4. Percentage of state voters who are union members. This sub-indicator was added because one way that labor unions mobilize their members is by encouraging them to vote and to vote for particular candidates or ballot measures. This reflects the notion that members of any labor union may support broadly union-friendly candidates and policies in solidarity with teacher unions.
5. Percentage of state voters who are both union members and employed in the educational service industry. This sub-indicator approximates the voting power of teacher union members, as there are not consistent data on the number of teacher union members who vote.
6. Number of candidates endorsed by state teacher unions. This sub-indicator provides evidence of one political activity that state-level teacher unions can engage in to influence election outcomes.
7. Percentage of state teacher union-endorsed candidates who won elections. Higher percentages of successful endorsements may reflect unions that better mobilize their members or whose endorsements carry more influence.
8. Number of political ads for state and local races sponsored by teacher unions. This sub-indicator measures a visible way teacher unions can attempt to influence election outcomes.
9. Percentage of political ads for state and local races sponsored by teacher unions. This sub-indicator considers, relative to other political ad purchasers, the number of political advertisements teacher unions sponsored.
10. Amount of money spent on political ads. This sub-indicator measures the financial resources dedicated to political advertising as a means of influencing elections.
11. Percentage of political ad spending. This sub-indicator considers ad spending relative to other organizations sponsoring political advertisements.
12. Presence of state-level policies allowing the establishment of charter schools. This sub-indicator accounts for the states that do not allow charter schools at all compared with states that have a high level of charter school structural limitations. Unions tend to oppose the establishment of charter schools.
13. Presence of state-level policies requiring teacher certification for charter schools. This sub-indicator was added because of the changing political context of charter schools, with unions tending to oppose exemptions to teacher certification policies.
14. Percentage of charter schools with collective bargaining. This sub-indicator accounts for differential levels of charter school unionization by state. Charter schools with varying legal exemptions from policies such as collective bargaining can be thought of as operating outside of teacher union influence, but this measure accounts for the states in which teacher unions may have influence within charter schools.
15. Presence of state-level policies allowing education savings accounts. This sub-indicator was added because school choice and voucher policies have become more widespread. Education savings accounts were first introduced in Arizona in 2011, only shortly before the publication of the previous teacher union rankings report. Teacher unions have opposed school choice policies that could result in moving funding away from traditional public schools.
16. Presence of state-level policies allowing tax-credit scholarships. This sub-indicator was added because school choice and voucher policies have become more widespread. The first tax-credit scholarship program was created in 1998 by Arizona, with programs becoming more common in the past 20 years.
17. Presence of state-level policies allowing vouchers. This sub-indicator was added because voucher policies have become more widespread. Vouchers are now an issue highlighted by both the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers in their national agendas.
18. Percentage of K–12 student population not using private education choice programs. This sub-indicator captures the level of participation in private school choice policies: education savings accounts, tax-credit scholarships, and vouchers.
19. Percentage of K–12 student population using traditional public schools and not alternatives such as private schools, homeschooling, charter schools, and magnet schools. This sub-indicator captures the use of traditional public schools by the state population, with these schools being the model most supported by teacher unions.
20. Average salary of public-school teachers. This sub-indicator was included because one policy area that teacher unions often have direct negotiating power over, via collective bargaining, is teacher salaries.
21. Overall perceptions: identified the teacher union as either the most influential entity or individual or one of the most influential entities or individuals in K–12 education policymaking for the state. This sub-indicator was an open-ended survey item that allowed respondents to identify any policy actors they felt were influential in state education policymaking. Although similar to the perceived influence of teacher unions from the adjusted measures, this item was asked early in the survey without providing a list of possible actors, to minimize priming effects and to allow respondents to include actors that might be state-specific or not included in a survey list.
22. Overall perceptions: level of agreement with “Teacher unions/associations in [STATE] are stronger today than they were five years ago.” This sub-indicator was added to gauge overall perceptions of state teacher union power relative to a previous time. If unions are perceived as declining, that may contribute to a broader perception that they are not useful allies and that political actors do not need to pay attention to them, and vice versa if they are seen as strengthening.
23. Perceptions of available resources and membership: level of agreement with “Teacher unions/associations in [STATE] can mobilize members to engage in actions aligned with union/association priorities.” This sub-indicator was added to gauge how effectively teacher unions can mobilize members. If a union has a high level of membership but is unable to mobilize members, it most likely has less political power than a union that can mobilize its members.
24. Perceptions of available resources and membership: perceived ability of teacher unions to engage members in eight mobilization activities. This sub-indicator was added to capture multiple ways unions can mobilize members to influence policy.
25. Perceptions of available resources and membership: perceived likelihood of following through on a threat to strike. This sub-indicator was added because a strike threat holds more political power when it is perceived to be a legitimate threat.
26. Perceptions of available resources and membership: perceived ability to leverage a strike to influence policy. This sub-indicator was included because a strike is more effective as a political tool if policymakers are likely to make some policy change to bring about an end to the strike.
27. Perceptions of available resources and membership: perceived availability of local teacher unions’ power. This sub-indicator captures how state-level teacher union organizations can mobilize or coordinate local unions for collective, statewide action. Because unions are federated organizations, it is important to understand how local unions—the organizations that teachers pay dues to—use their power to affect state policy.
28. Perceptions of involvement in politics: perceived influence over policy implementation. This sub-indicator was included because the union can also be involved in conversations and negotiations that set rules and procedures for implementing policies. These actions can affect how a policy is enacted in practice.
29. Perceptions of involvement in politics: perceived influence via working relationships with legislators. This sub-indicator captures how teacher unions can build relationships with policymakers that may result in more favorable policies.

Six measures no longer included are not incorporated into the updated rankings, most commonly because of issues with data availability.

1. Percentage of state’s delegates to the Democratic and Republican national conventions who were members of teacher unions. The data source for the 2012 survey was the 2000 Convention Delegate Survey. This survey is no longer in the field, and there are no updated data or comparable alternative data available.
2. Terms of employment: how seniority and teacher performance are considered in teacher layoff decisions. We could not find comparable updated data from the original source (NCTQ) or from any alternative sources.
3. Terms of employment: percentage of the teaching workforce dismissed because of poor performance. The 2012 report used the 2007–08 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) data, which included a measure of the average percentage of teachers dismissed in public school districts. We could not find an update more recent than the 2011–12 SASS. Newer versions of this survey, now the National Teacher and Principal Survey (NTPS), do not ask comparable questions or collect comparable data that are freely and publicly available. No comparable alternative sources were identified.
4. Would you say that teacher unions generally make concessions to prevent reductions in pay and benefits or that they fight hard to prevent those reductions? This question was asked within the context of budget challenges in the period immediately after the Great Recession.
5. To what extent were state education policies proposed by the governor during your state’s latest legislative session in line with teacher union priorities? This question was not included in the 2025 survey in the interest of space and time constraints. The measure of alignment with union priorities remains.
6. How often have the priorities of state education leaders aligned with teacher union positions in the past three years? This question was not included in the 2025 survey in the interest of space and time constraints. The measure of alignment with union priorities remains.

Endnotes

About this Study

This report was made possible through funding from the Sarah Scaife Foundation, The Achelis and Bodman Foundation, and The Anschutz Foundation. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the foundations that supported this work.

We are deeply grateful to authors Melissa Arnold Lyon (University at Albany), Sandy Frost Waldron (independent researcher), and Rebecca Jacobsen (Michigan State University) for their diligence and collaboration, and to external advisers Michael Hartney (Boston College) and Jeffrey Henig (Columbia University), who provided thoughtful and substantive feedback on the draft report. Here at Fordham, we thank our former colleague Adam Tyner, who launched the project; Meredith Coffey and David Griffith for managing the project and editing the report; Chester E. Finn, Jr., Michael J. Petrilli, and Amber M. Northern for providing feedback on the draft; Brian Fitzpatrick for providing feedback and creating the interactive table; Jill Hoppe, Ali Schalop, and Robert Chung for assisting with research; Stephanie Distler for managing report production and design; and Victoria McDougald for overseeing media dissemination. We also extend our gratitude to David Yontz for copyediting and to Dave Williams for creating the report’s figures.

Finally, thanks to AI for the cover illustration. If something looks slightly off, you're not imagining it.