Last week’s Denver school board election made clear that 2030 will likely be the next real opportunity for Denver Public Schools (DPS) to chart a new course. While the election was a major setback for education reform in Denver (and further evidence that blue-state ed reform is over), I believe there’s still a silver lining. The challenges facing students and public education have only deepened. Sometimes it’s better to let the old structure burn down than to keep patching a collapsing house.
Many observers, myself included, expected a close race for the four contested board seats. Reform candidates were well-funded (with two to four times the amount of money as the union), but the teachers union candidates were stronger than usual. Observers figured most of the reform candidates would eke out a win. But almost no one anticipated that the union-backed slate would win all four seats so decisively.
Why did this happen, and what lessons can we take from it?
1. Blurred lines between candidates. In 2025, it was often hard to distinguish reform candidates from teachers-union-backed ones. Nearly everyone ran on similar messages—support for increased school funding, more mental health resources, and higher teacher pay. Only careful observers could discern subtle differences: Reformers were slightly more open about supporting public school choice or school autonomy, while union candidates leaned toward limiting both. This lack of contrast gave voters little reason to engage deeply.
2. Low voter engagement. Turnout told the story. Twice as many voters skipped the school board section of the ballot compared to 2023. Without the reform candidates highlighting controversies—like board dysfunction, student safety, or growing achievement gaps—many voters simply tuned out. The district’s “Green” state rating, despite dismal proficiency among low-income students, likely lulled voters into complacency.
3. Sharper teachers union strategy. The union learned from its past missteps. It fielded better candidates, launched campaigns earlier, and maintained a disciplined, teacher-centered message. Notably, it abandoned two incumbent board members viewed as ineffective or toxic—even by union insiders—and replaced them with more appealing newcomers. The result was a stronger, cleaner campaign that resonated with voters.
4. Reform money backlash. The union’s messaging against out-of-state “dark reform money” (City Fund, Republican contributors, e.g., Bruce Benson, former head of the Colorado Republican Party), and Republican party endorsements for reform candidates likely impacted some voters, especially in liberal Denver with so many attacks (on immigration and other issues) coming from Trump. The main backer of reform candidates, Denver Families, did little to counter these attacks, not disclosing their local board leadership and any specific objectives for the district other than claiming to be the voice of the community. Some earlier groups that backed reform candidates like Democrats for Education Reform received similar critiques from opponents but were transparent about their board, objectives, and clear Democratic credentials. This time, reformers appeared evasive and less connected to the city’s political and community leadership, giving the union an easy narrative advantage.
5. No clear reform agenda. Reformers ran on competence, not ideas. Their pitch, “We’re the adults in the room,” worked in 2023 amid voter concerns on school safety and the board dysfunction reminiscent of a Jerry Springer show. But in 2025, without a distinctive vision for improving academic outcomes, it didn’t resonate. Voters heard two nearly identical messages about supporting teachers and predictably chose the candidates actually backed by the teachers union. Reformers’ misunderstanding of why they won in 2023 seemed to lead to strategic complacency in 2025.
6. The “big blue” political wave. National politics also played a role. Though all candidates were Democrats, union-backed contenders appeared more authentically progressive. Reformers’ associations with Republican donors—however tenuous—hurt them in a deep-blue city where Trump-era polarization still looms large. The union candidates benefited from being perceived as “true blue.”
In short: The union took advantage of the big blue political wave (and likely a more active teachers union base) with better candidates than usual, while reformers ran generic campaigns with paid workers and spent lots on flyers, TV, and social media. When Denver voters were asked to choose between “teacher lite” and “teachers union,” they chose the true-blue teachers union candidates.
What’s next for Denver
The new seven-member board now has a solid teachers union majority, with only one or two reform-minded members remaining. This board will likely act more cohesively—and more effectively—than the fractious union-led boards of recent years.
Their first major decision will be whether to renew Superintendent Alex Marrero’s contract for another three years or to replace him if he takes a Chicago job, where he’s now a finalist. Marrero’s leadership style has been traditional and hierarchical, moving DPS away from many of the school portfolio practices of former Superintendents Bennet and Boasberg.
If Marrero stays, expect continued erosion of school-level decision-making and charter collaboration. Innovation Schools (traditional public schools with some charter-like autonomy) are most at risk. Also expect a roll-back of student-based budgeting, a key equity policy that directs more funds to low-income students. Charter schools will survive due to state protections, but operating a charter or any autonomous district-managed school in Denver will become increasingly difficult.
It is hard to say what a new superintendent will focus on if Marrero leaves except to prioritize Denver’s teachers union objectives: raising teacher salaries, reducing workdays, lowering class size, and curbing charter and innovation schools.
Ironically, Marrero’s recent approach to addressing declining enrollment by closing low-performing schools mirrors the reform strategies of predecessors like Tom Boasberg, proof that some realities of running an urban district are inescapable. Shuttering failing schools, utilizing school choice, and using school performance data for critical management decisions may not be favored by teachers unions. But these practices work, including now, when districts are forced to close schools because of declining enrollment. Denver’s centralized choice system, despite some controversy, remains deeply valued by families and is unlikely to be rolled back, though I would expect some change. Reforms like the universal choice system and charter schools have remained sticky and will likely endure despite political shifts.
Lessons for school improvers in blue states nationwide
1. Understand the cultural and political terrain. Reformers must engage with the cultural and sociological realities of urban education politics. As Paul Hill and Ashley Jochim argue in Making Politics Work: Practical Lessons for Would-Be Education Reformers, successful change requires long-term political strategy, not just good problem framing or policy ideas.
2. Be transparent. Hidden donors and vague agendas erode trust. Denver voters will not support movements perceived as opaque or Republican-adjacent.
3. Rebuild a broad coalition for a movement. The reform movement of the 2010s thrived on diverse civic, business, parent, and community alliances. Today’s reform scene feels insular and disconnected. Reviving it will require true grassroots and grass-top coalitions around shared goals. Movements require a diverse set of activists sharing some common goals, sometimes working together and sometimes using different strategies to achieve a set of goals. Having a centrally managed “harbormaster,” while seemingly efficient, makes for an easy target from the opposition, especially if funded by non-community sources, and can be blind to changing landscapes. Not to mention having an opposition “movement” fueled by one organization, however well-funded, is a recipe for disaster for long-term change.
4. Connect reform to teachers and families. Progress in a blue city demands partnership, not polarization. Reforms must resonate with educators’ daily experiences and families’ aspirations, not just technocratic ideals. And the district itself must define what an “effective school” is. Without a shared compass, improvement stalls, and it becomes difficult for the district, city or community to design a plan for district improvement.
5. Rethink school board elections. Denver should consider reforms that level the playing field—perhaps public financing for school board races—to attract a broader pool of candidates and reduce the dominance of special interests on all sides.
A path forward
All is not lost. Sometimes it takes a big loss to reset and rebuild. Reformers, new and grizzled, should use this moment to reflect, regroup, and reimagine how Denver Public Schools can better serve its 90,000 students with more than half of them struggling to meet basic academic requirements for success. We know a great deal about what works. The challenge now is organizing people, politics, and power to make it happen.
As I reflect on two decades of progress and missteps, I think less of Camus’s Sisyphus (often my patron saint) and more of Tyack and Cuban’s Tinkering Toward Utopia. The road to improvement is long and uneven, but Denver is making progress with better schools for low-income students and far more students being prepared for college and work then when I started this journey in the city in the last century.
Education reform may be dead for now in Denver, but there are still plenty of things to do. We are, in the end, still tinkering toward some utopia—or at least improvement.
